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This paper use spatial econometric models to test for racial preferences in a small urban 
housing market. Identifying racial preferences is difficult when unobserved neighborhood 
amenities vary systematically with racial composition. We adopt three strategies to 
redress this problem: (1) we focus on housing price differences across 
microneighborhoods in the small and relatively homogenous city of Kingston, New York; 
(2) we introduce GIS-based spatial amenity variables as controls in the hedonic 
regressions; and (3) we use spatial error and lag models to explicitly account for the 
spatial dependence of unobserved neighborhood amenities. Our simple OLS estimates 
agree with the consensus in the literature that black neighborhoods have lower housing 
prices. However, racial price discounts are no longer significant when we account for the 
spatial dependence of errors. Our results suggest that price discounts in black 
neighborhoods are caused not by racial preferences but by the demand for amenities that 
are typically not found in black neighborhoods. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Housing became the dominant asset of most American households during the 
unprecedented housing boom of the last two decades.1 The vast gains in housing values 
were, however, distributed unequally across regions, cities, and neighborhoods. Good 
schools and amenities, low crime rates, and a high quality housing stock characterize the 
desirable neighborhoods with high and appreciating prices; troubled schools, dilapidated 
public spaces, high crime rates, and a deteriorating housing stock have continued to 
depress housing prices in other neighborhoods. These cycles exist at the 
microneighborhood level, as most American cities are a patchwork of good and bad 
neighborhoods that may span as little as a few city blocks. 
In the United States, the divergence of housing prices across neighborhoods is 
associated with race. Four decades after state-ordered segregation was eliminated, 
neighborhoods remain segregated along racial lines (Hacker 2003; Cashin 2004). In the 
post-civil rights era, residential segregation in and of itself is not as great a problem as the 
differences in the quality and value of housing in segregated neighborhoods: 
 
Most African Americans do not crave integration although they 
support it. What seems to matter most to people is not living in a 
well-integrated neighborhood but having the same access to 
good things in life as everyone else. (Cashin 2004: XIII) 
 
A large body of literature has found that black neighborhoods have lower housing 
prices (Bailey 1966; King and Mieszkowski 1973; Yinger 1978; Kiel and Zabel 1996; 
Myers 2004; Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Kiel and Zabel 2008).2 Racial price 
gaps are often attributed to preferences for segregation (Bayer and McMillan 2008). Some 
households may have a desire to live in close proximity to members of the same group to 
take advantage of social networks, cultural opportunities, and access to ethnic goods. 
                                                 
1 The Case-Shiller national housing price index more than doubled from 79.61 in 1996 to a peak of 189.93 
in the second quarter of 2006 before falling sharply to 128.81 in the first quarter of 2009. In contrast, this 
index increased by less than 20 points in the ten years before 1996. 
2 See Zabel (2008) and Bayer and McMillan (2008) for recent reviews of the literature.  
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Other households may exhibit prejudice, a taste for living apart from another group.3 
Regardless of the source, racial preferences yield racial price gaps in two distinct ways; if 
racial preferences are symmetric, the effective demand for housing in black 
neighborhoods may be lower because black households, on average, have smaller 
budgets. If racial preferences are asymmetric, i.e., whites prefer segregation and blacks 
prefer integration, racial price gaps arise even when there are no income or wealth 
differences; the demand of both blacks and whites for housing in white neighborhoods 
would be relatively high.4 Empirically, it is well-known that the demand of white 
households for housing in black neighborhoods is considerably lower than the demand of 
black households for housing in white neighborhoods. About 85 percent of black 
households but only a handful of white households, in studies summarized in Hacker 
(2003), express a preference for fully integrated neighborhoods. 
Based on the empirical evidence, it may be tempting to ascribe racial price gaps to 
prejudice. However, establishing such a causal relationship is complicated by the strong 
correlation between race and neighborhood amenities. In the United States, there is a 
well-documented shortage of black neighborhoods with favorable amenities such as 
schools, public safety, and environmental quality.5 When amenities and racial 
composition are bundled, black households may seek housing in white neighborhoods 
even when they have a preference for segregation. Similarly, white households may seek 
housing in white neighborhoods even if they have a preference of integration.6 The low 
demand for black neighborhoods could simply be a reflection of the low demand for 
inferior neighborhoods.7 
                                                 
3 In a recent survey of the literature, Zabel (2008) defines racial prejudice as “a preference for neighbors of 
the same race,” encapsulating both positive and negative preferences. Following Bayer and McMillan 
(2008), we adopt the term “racial preferences” to denote a taste for segregation, reserving the term 
“prejudice” to signify negative racial preferences. 
4 The “border” model of Bailey (1966) used this assumption to explain why black neighborhoods at the 
border had higher prices compared to adjacent white neighborhoods in highly segregated cities of the pre-
civil rights era. 
5 According to Bayer and McMillan (2006), only 2.5 percent of the census tracts that are at least 40 percent 
black and only 1.1 percent of the census tracts that are at least 60 black have a college-educated population 
of at least 40 percent. In the United States as a whole, 22.6 percent of census tracts have a college-educated 
population of at least 40 percent. 
6 This amenity argument contrast with the assumption made in the “border” model of Bailey (1966) and 
others that blacks prefer integration and white prefer segregation. 
7 As middle-class black neighborhoods emerge allowing black households to “unbundle” their 
preference for neighborhood amenities from their preference for self-segregation, racial price   4
With heterogenous neighborhood quality, racial price gaps can also arise from 
discrimination. In the context of homeownership, discrimination is typically manifested as 
institutionalized prejudice in the housing and mortgage markets (Munnell, Browne, 
Tootell, and McEneaney 1996; Tootell 1996).8 A large number of empirical studies have 
found that black households play a premium to obtain housing in integrated or white 
neighborhoods, confirming the continued presence of discrimination (Kiel and Zabel 
1996; Myers 2004). Without prejudice or neighborhood heterogeneity, discrimination 
does not necessarily lead to racial price gaps. King and Mieszkowski (1973) find, for 
example, that housing in segregated black neighborhoods sell at a premium because of the 
additional demand generated by black households that are excluded from white 
neighborhoods. Price discounts are observed when discrimination compels black 
households to concentrate in neighborhoods that lack amenities. 
Clearly, the race-amenity correlation in contemporary American neighborhoods 
has historical links to prejudice, discrimination, and state-sanctioned segregation (Cutler, 
Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999). The goal of this paper is to study the consequences rather than 
the causes of this historical correlation. With a dearth of high-amenity black 
neighborhoods, both black households with a preference for segregation and white 
households with a preference for integration would continue to shun historically black 
neighborhoods. As long as amenity differences exist, demand asymmetries and price 
differences will persist even if discrimination and prejudice are eliminated. 
Identifying racial preferences in equilibrium housing price differences is 
complicated when a strong three-way correlation exists between race, income, and 
neighborhood quality. In the voluminous literature on this topic, only a few studies have 
made an explicit effort to account for observed and unobserved neighborhood 
heterogeneity. Constructing an instrument for racial composition is practically difficult 
except in pseudoexperimental settings where black households were randomly assigned to 
neighborhoods. Without resorting to experimental data, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 
(2007) adopt a novel identification strategy based on a “boundary discontinuity” model 
associated with school districts. Their key insight is that, controlling for school quality, 
                                                                                                                                                  
gaps will decrease, but segregation may in fact increase (Bayer and McMillan 2006). 
8 Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) refers to prejudice and discrimination as decentralized and centralized 
racism, respectively.  
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the racial price gaps in census blocks that are adjacent to elementary school boundaries 
can be attributed to racial preferences. They find that the significant correlation between 
racial composition and housing prices disappears when controls for school quality and 
boundary fixed effects are introduced. 
This paper adopts a different approach to test for the presence of racial preferences 
in the small urban housing market of Kingston, New York. Our unique data set, 
constructed by combining the city records of home sales (City of Kingston 2008), block 
group level data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2000), and spatial locational data from 
GeoLytics, Inc (2008), has several helpful features. In contrast to most previous studies 
that have examined large and heterogenous neighborhoods in large metropolitan areas, all 
households in our data set are located in a seven square mile area of relatively 
homogenous housing stock and share the same labor market, school district, cultural 
amenities, and transportation infrastructure. By narrowing our scope to price differences 
across microneighborhoods in one small city, we are able to minimize estimation 
problems that arise from unobserved neighborhood heterogeneity. To further reduce 
omitted variable bias arising from the correlation of racial composition and amenities, we 
include GIS-based control variables that measure the distance from each house to 
exogenous amenities. 
Our primary methodological contribution is the use of spatial econometric 
methods to account for the spatial dependence of unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics. With positively spatially autocorrelated errors, OLS tends to 
underestimate standard errors in hedonic regressions. If the unobserved amenities are 
correlated with racial composition of neighborhoods, OLS also yields biased coefficient 
estimates. These two problems can lead OLS-based studies to incorrectly conclude that 
the presence of black households lowers neighborhood housing prices. We estimate 
spatial error and spatial lag models; the spatial error model obtains correct standard errors 
by explicitly modeling the spatial autocorrelation of unobserved amenities. The spatial lag 
model obtains unbiased coefficient estimates by including a spatially weighted average of 
neighborhood housing prices as a regressor. Spatial econometric methods allow us to 
separate racial preferences from unobserved spatially dependent amenities. Without 
location data at the household level, previous studies have, at best, used neighborhood   6
fixed effects or robust cluster estimators to obtain unbiased coefficients and standard 
errors.9 
Our data set has two additional methodological advantages. First, we are able to 
disentangle race effects from income and amenity effects more easily than in larger and 
more segregated cities because a substantial proportion of white households in Kingston 
are poor and the correlation between racial composition and the quality of amenities is 
relatively low. Second, because the city is relatively racially integrated, we are able to 
overcome the problems related to the interpretation of hedonic model coefficients as the 
capitalization of racial preferences in the housing market (Bayer and McMillan 2008). 
Our choice of Kingston for this study is driven not only by the methodological 
advantages, but by our interest in extending a literature that has been dominated by 
studies of large and segregated metropolitan areas to small cities that are predominantly 
white and relatively racially integrated. Kingston is representative of a large number of 
small post-industrial cities in the Northeastern United States that have recently absorbed 
racially heterogenous migrants from the large metropolitan centers. As rural areas and 
smaller cities of the United States become more racially diverse, we believe that this shift 
in focus to smaller housing markets is timely and instructive for policy purposes. 
 
2.  DATA 
 
Our study is located in Kingston, NY, a city of about 23,000 people located 90 miles 
north of New York City. Kingston has a long history as a commercial, industrial, and 
administrative hub of the Hudson Valley region, including a brief stint as the first capital 
of New York State in the 18th century. Until the early 20th century, its economy thrived 
as a river port, the terminus of the canal system, and a center of brick building and other 
small-scale industry. As the economic importance of the Hudson River and the canal 
system waned, Kingston’s economic fortunes declined. The city’s economic progress was 
further undermined in the early 1990s when an IBM plant, the city’s dominant employer, 
closed. The historic business districts were usurped by suburban shopping malls that were 
built outside the city limits. Upper- and middle-class whites moved out to the suburbs, 
                                                 
9 See Bayer and McMillan (2008) for a discussion of the literature.  
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while blacks and, subsequently, Hispanics moved in to the inner city (table 1). The 
economic and demographic trajectory of Kingston is representative of once-vibrant small 
cities in the Northeast that have struggled to establish a viable post-industrial economy. 
We obtain neighborhood data on racial and ethnic composition, income per capita, 
education, and poverty status from the U.S. Census Bureau (2000). Table 3 presents the 
summary statistics of the neighborhood variables by census block group.10 The city 
boundaries contain eight census tracts, the neighborhood unit commonly used in the 
literature.11 At the tract level, the black population is moderately segregated with a little 
less than 65 percent concentrated in three (9517, 9520, 9521) of the eight tracts. Five out 
of the eight tracts had a black population of more than 15 percent. Only one tract, 9521, 
had a black population of more than 25 percent (figure 1). Examining data at the census 
block group level, the smallest geographical unit for which neighborhood data are 
available, it becomes quite clear that the census tract level is not appropriate for the study 
of neighborhood differences in racial composition (figure 2). Close to forty percent of the 
city’s black population reside in just four block groups, 9517-2, 9517-3, 9521-2, and 
9521-3. The census tract boundaries bundle these block groups with relatively white 
neighborhoods. The starkest example of this is the census tract 9521 where two heavily 
black block groups that are 34.5 and 41.3 percent black are grouped with a predominantly 
white block group that has less than 9 percent blacks.12 
Census block group level data also indicate moderate segregation. Although the 
city’s black population exceeds 12 percent, ten out of the twenty-four block groups have 
less than 10 percent blacks. Residential segregation of neighborhoods can be formally 
summarized using three widely used indices: 1) the dissimilarity index between blacks 
and whites (D); 2) the isolation index of blacks (I); and 3) the exposure (or interaction) 
                                                 
10 A census block group (BG) is “a cluster of census blocks having the same first digit of their four-digit 
identifying numbers within a census tract. BGs generally contain between 600 and 3,000 people, with an 
optimum size of 1,500 people” (U.S. Census Bureau, Geography Division, Cartographic Products 
Management Branch, July 18, 2001).  
11 Census tracts are “small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county.” Census tracts “usually 
have between 2,500 and 8,000 persons and, when first delineated, are designed to be homogeneous with 
respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions” (U.S. Census Bureau, 
Geography Division, April 19, 2000). We ignore the small part of tract 9516 that lies inside the city 
boundary, and define the city to include tracts 9517 through 9524. 
12 A similar within-tract difference is observed in tract 9517 that contained block groups that were 11, 15, 
28.9, and 35 percent black, respectively.   8
index (E) of whites to blacks.13 The dissimilarity and isolation indices support our 
assertion that census block groups provide a more accurate picture of racial segregation in 
Kingston (table 2). The measures of segregation also confirm that Kingston is relatively 
racially integrated compared to other larger cities of the Northeast.14 As the minority 
population increased from 1990 to 2000, Kingston has became substantially more 
integrated: An average white person in Kingston lived in a block group with 9 percent 
blacks in 1990 (even though the proportion of blacks in the city was almost 13 percent) 
and in a block group with 14 percent blacks in 2000 (compared to the overall proportion 
of 15 percent). The average black person, on the other hand, continues to live in a 
neighborhood with 21 percent blacks. 
We obtain housing prices from the publicly available home sales records of City 
of Kingston (2008). Our data set contains 1,678 home sales that took place from 2001 to 
2007. In addition to the sale price, the city records contain the street address and the 
following information on the house: 1) year built; 2) style (cape, old style, ranch, etc.);  
3) presence of a fireplace; 4) number of bedrooms; 5) number of bathrooms; and 6) 
square footage. We do not have any measures of the condition or the quality of the house. 
By using actual home sales prices, we avoid the response bias problems associated with 
self-reported home values that are typically used in the literature.15 For example, black 
                                                 
13 The three indices are defined as follows;  
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where  bi, wi and tiare the black, white, and total populations of the neighborhood (tract or block group) 
and B and W are the total black and white populations of the city. See Population Studies Center, University 
of Michigan (2009) for details. 
14 For example, the block group level dissimilarity index for Kingston is 0.29, compared to 0.79, 0.68, 0.72, 
and 0.57 in Philadelphia, New York, Buffalo, and New Haven, respectively (Population Studies Center, 
University of Michigan 2009). 
15 See DiPasquale and Somerville (1995) and Kiel and Zabel (2003) for discussion of the self-reporting bias  
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homeowners in black neighborhoods may systematically underestimate the extent of 
racial prejudice in assessing their home values. The downside of using actual sale prices 
is that our analysis is limited to the subset of houses that are transacted that is perhaps not 
representative of the housing stock in general.16 The sample selection bias problem could 
be overcome if we used the assessed value of the property; we decided against using 
assessed values, however, because the city government’s assessment may be less sensitive 
to racial characteristics of the neighborhood than the market valuation. 
The housing market in Kingston is quite typical for a small city in the region. 
Following the national and regional trends, home sales prices in Kingston appreciated 
rapidly from 1996 to 2007 with the sharpest increase occurring between 2001 and 2007. 
The mean home sales prices increased 38 percent between 1996 and 2001, and by 106 
percent between 2001 and 2007. The corresponding differences in the rates of change for 
median prices are even more dramatic, 37 percent between 1996 and 2001 and 193 
percent between 2001 and 2007. 
We use the GeoCode DVD geocoding software (GeoLytics, Inc. 2008) to generate 
the location coordinates for each address. The neighborhood variables from the census are 
then merged with the home sales data. We see from the merged data that housing prices 
of neighborhoods have converged sharply, i.e., the rates of appreciation of houses are 
greater in neighborhoods that had low prices at the outset (figure 3). For every $10,000 
increase in the initial median house price of a neighborhood, the appreciation was 15 
percentage points less.17 Despite the overall increase and convergence in housing prices, 
houses in relatively black neighborhoods sell at a large discount (figure 4). For every 
percentage point increase in the black population, the median housing price is lower on 
average by $1,400. The discount seems even larger for the most homogenous white 
neighborhoods. However, the rate of appreciation in housing prices does not appear to be 
strongly correlated with the rate of change in the black population (figure 5). In block 
group 9517-3, a large appreciation of housing prices correspond with a sharp decline in 
                                                                                                                                                  
in the American Housing Survey data used by many studies. 
16 The total number of parcels in the city of Kingston is 8,724. Of this, 1,678 home sales are included in the 
sample. 
17 It should be noted here, however, that the absolute price increases may not have converged, i.e., the same 
absolute increase in home values constitute a larger percentage appreciation in low initial value 
neighborhoods.   10
the black population in the preceding decade. This pattern is consistent with an increased 
demand for houses from whites with gentrification. The opposite pattern holds for block 
group 9517-1 where a large appreciation of housing prices is correlated with an influx of 
black residents in the previous decade. Here, a poor white neighborhood seems to have 
gained from entry of black home-buyers. 
 
3. THE ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
Following much of the literature on racial preferences in housing markets, this paper uses 
a hedonic pricing model.18 Most previous hedonic models find a price discount in black 
neighborhoods (Bailey 1966; Yinger 1978; Myers 2004).19 Whether these discounts can 
be interpreted as prejudice depends on the extent to which the measurement, spatial 
dependence, and endogeneity problems are addressed in the econometric specification. 
The choice of neighborhood unit is a major concern; in a small city, racial 
segregation occurs at a spatial unit smaller than a census tract used by Yinger (1978), but 
larger than the ten-house clusters used by Myers (2004). To address the measurement 
problem, we define the census block group as a neighborhood. In Kingston, each of the 
seven census tracts is divided to between one to four block groups. Most previous studies 
use census tracts or larger units such as PUMAs to delineate a neighborhood. The use of 
relatively large units is problematic because they tend to bundle socioeconomically and 
demographically heterogenous neighborhoods. Only a handful of studies have attempted 
to use microneighborhoods; Myers (2004) uses a unique data set to construct 
microneighborhood clusters of ten nearest neighbors. While the use of 
microneighborhoods is a move in the right direction, Myers may have overcompensated 
by misclassifying households that are located in mixed-race neighborhoods, but have 
immediate neighbors of the same race. In this paper, we follow Myers’ suggestion that 
census blocks or block groups may provide the right compromise between sample size 
                                                 
18 There is a related literature on racial discrimination that tests whether black homebuyers pay a premium. 
These studies utilize data sets where the race of the owner or buyer is identified (Kiel and Zabel 1996; 
Myers 2004). Most of these studies test for both prejudice and discrimination. We discuss only the results 
relevant to our research question, the presence of racial price discounts at the neighborhood level. 
19 A notable exception is King and Mieszkowski’s (1973) study of rental prices in New Haven, which found 
a premium in all-black and mixed areas compared to all-white areas.  
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and uniformity in characteristics. 
Bayer and McMillan (2008) have argued that the hedonic model is appropriate 
only when households can freely choose house and neighborhood attributes to maximize 
utility based on continuous hedonic price functions: These conditions are violated when 
there is a small fraction of black households and the neighborhoods are heavily 
segregated because hedonic prices will then reveal marginal rather than mean preferences. 
Because the marginal resident is likely to have a greater preference for integration 
compared to the inframarginal residents, racial preferences in such housing markets are 
not capitalized. The “bundling” of race and other attributes (e.g., it is not possible to 
increase the consumption of an “educated” neighborhood without increasing the 
consumption of a “white” neighborhood) also makes it difficult to interpret hedonic 
model coefficients because all amenity choices are not independently available to 
households. Because our unique data set comes from a relatively racially integrated city, 
and because the correlation between race and neighborhood amenities is relatively low, 
we contend that the hedonic model is appropriate for the purposes of our study. 




where P is a n×1 vector of sale prices, X is n×k vector of house- and neighborhood-level 
independent variables (including the racial composition) and ε is a n×1 vector that 
captures the unobserved characteristics of the house and neighborhood. 
Because the error term ε includes exogenous neighborhood characteristics that 
may be correlated with the racial composition of the neighborhood, the causal 
interpretation of a racial price discount in the OLS model is problematic. For example, the 
largest black neighborhood in Kingston is bordered by the main commercial thoroughfare 
and a railroad. If we fail to control for spatial amenities that exogenously influence 
neighborhood housing prices, we run the risk of overestimating racial price discounts and 
underestimating standard errors. Our choice of a spatially compact small city within a 
single labor market and school district alleviates some of these concerns. We also include   12
three spatial amenity variables. Based on the location coordinates of each house, we 
compute using GIS software: 1) the minimum straight line distance to the CSX railroad; 
2) the minimum road distance to Broadway, the main commercial thoroughfare; and 3) 
the minimum road distance to the center of the Uptown business district.20 These control 
variables help reduce the estimation bias that arises from neighborhood heterogeneity. 
The three spatial controls, in our judgment, capture much of the exogenous desirability of 
locations in Kingston. Given Kingston’s small size, there is very little variation in access 
to other amenities such as the distance to shopping areas and highways. There is some 
unobserved variation in housing prices due to localized crime rates, access to green space, 
scenic views, and distances to elementary schools of varying quality. These remaining 
effects are likely to be spatially heterogeneous, dependent, and autocorrelated. 
Within the OLS framework, we estimate three variants that aim to partially 
address these problems. The first is to compute Huber-White robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroskedasticity that arises in part from the spatial heterogeneity of the 
errors. The second is to construct clustered sandwich standard errors the allows for errors 
to be correlated within but not across block groups. The third is to add census tract-level 
fixed effects to account for spatial heterogeneity. Note, however, that both clustered 
standard errors and fixed effects are not able to capture correlation and heterogeneity 
within arbitrarily defined neighborhood boundaries. The clustered standard errors take the 
block group as the boundary within which all households have correlated errors. In the 
fixed effects specification, we are able to control for amenities that are shared by all 
households within a census tract.21 
We then use spatial econometric models that fully incorporate the error structure 
of the hedonic model.22 The first variant, the spatial lag model, includes a spatially 
weighted average of surrounding home prices as an independent variable in the hedonic 
model. The inclusion of spatial lags can be directly justified because of institutional 
peculiarities of the housing market, such as the use of comparison pricing. A more 
compelling argument comes from the reduced form of the spatial lag model; the inclusion 
                                                 
20 For the railroad, we used straight line distances because the primary issue is noise pollution. 
21 We cannot include block group fixed effects because we need some variation in the neighborhood racial 
composition variable to estimate its coefficients. 
22 See Anselin and Bera (1998) for an overview of spatial econometrics and Anselin and Lozano-Garcia 
(2009) for a review of spatial hedonic models.  
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of the spatial lags of prices captures the influence of unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics on housing prices. If spatial lags are present, the OLS model yields biased 
and inconsistent coefficient estimates (Anselin and Bera 1998). 
The spatial lag model is specified as follows: 
 
where ρ is the coefficient on the spatial lag and W is a n×n spatial weight matrix that is 
constructed using location coordinates of houses. In W, the diagonal and all elements 
outside an exogenously determined distance threshold are zero. Inside the distance 
threshold, neighboring houses are assigned a row-normalized weight of equal magnitude. 
This weight matrix allows us to interpret the spatial lag as the spatially weighted average 
of neighborhood housing prices. OLS is unable to provide unbiased coefficients estimates 
because the spatial lag term is correlated with the error term. We use a maximum 
likelihood method to estimate the model under the assumption that the error term is 
normally distributed. 
The second variant, the spatial error model, explicitly models the spatial 
autocorrelation of the error term that arises because of the spatial correlation of 
unobserved attributes of the houses and neighborhoods, e.g., house quality, size, access to 
open space, crime rates, distance to amenities, and neighborhood boundaries. OLS is 
inefficient and yields incorrect standard errors in the presence of spatial errors. When both 
racial composition and the unobserved amenities are positively spatially correlated, as one 
would expect in our study, the OLS standard errors are likely to be biased downwards 
leading us to incorrectly reject null hypotheses on the significance of coefficients. We 
estimate the following spatial error model using maximum likelihood methods. 
   14
  
Here again we use the spatial weight matrix W to impose the spatial structure of the data. 
The parameter λ is a measure of the spatial autocorrelation. 
After we obtain OLS results, we test for spatial dependence in the residuals using 
the Moran’s I statistic, a measure of correlation between each residual and a spatially 
weighted average of neighborhood residuals. We also use Lagrange Multipler (LM) tests 
to establish whether spatial lags (ρ≠0)and errors (λ≠0) are present (Anselin and Bera 
1998). If both lags and errors are present, we use robust LM tests developed by Anselin, 
Bera, Florax ,and Yoon (1996) to ascertain whether addressing one problem resolves the 
other. For example, if LM tests find that both lags and errors are present, but robust LM 
tests find only errors, we can conclude that the spatial lags are not robust to the presence 
of spatial errors, but spatial errors are robust to the presence of spatial lags. In this case, 
the spatial error model is preferred to both the OLS and spatial lag models. 
We construct a series of spatial weight matrices for different distance thresholds. 
The distance thresholds define the radius of the area around each house that it is assumed 
to have spatial dependence. As the threshold increases, we allow a larger number of 
houses to influence each house, but reduce the magnitude of each weight. The minimum 
threshold is set at the distance where every house will have at least one neighbor, i.e., is 
not an island. If “islands” are present, the construction of row-standardized weights is 
impossible and spatial regression models yield incorrect estimates. For each threshold, we 
carry out tests to establish whether the spatial lag, spatial error, or OLS models is 
preferred, and the appropriate model is estimated. The optimal threshold can be obtained 
by maximizing the goodness of fit of the estimated models using the R square or the log 
likelihood or by choosing the threshold at which spatial autocorrelation (measured by the 
Moran’s I statistic) is greatest. Our goal, however, is not so much to find the best model, 
but to detect qualitative changes in racial price discounts at varying thresholds. Unlike  
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cluster standard errors that use arbitrary neighborhood boundaries, the spatial models 
allows us to sequentially search for boundaries at which spatial dependence influences 
coefficient estimates. To this end, we report results for all thresholds and focus on how 
the coefficient estimates are sensitive to the choice of model and threshold. 
 
4  RESULTS 
 
4.1  OLS Regressions 
Our benchmark is the OLS regression (table 4, column 1) that estimates log sale price of 
houses as a function of house and block group characteristics. The variables included 
explain 57.5 percent of the variation in housing prices, and the influence of neighborhood 
racial composition is strong and statistically significant. In our sample, neighborhoods 
with a 10 percentage increase in poor black households (and a corresponding decrease in 
nonpoor white households) experience a 7.1 percent average price discount, compared to 
a statistically insignificant discount of 3.5 percent for poor white households. 
Surprisingly, the presence of nonpoor black households is associated with an even 
larger discount of 10.2 percent. We are confident that the difference between black and 
white nonpoor households is not caused by differences in economic characteristics 
between the two groups. Because we control for the average household income, the 
difference in coefficients should be interpreted as the compensated effect of changing 
racial composition among the nonpoor, holding average income of the two groups 
constant. The price discount of nonpoor blacks is considerably larger than that of poor 
white households, further confirming the dominance of the racial effect over the poverty 
effect. 
The larger discount for the presence of nonpoor black households than for poor 
black households is more difficult to interpret. We offer two possible explanations. The 
first is the concentration of poor black households in rented group housing and public 
housing projects that are relatively segregated from owner-occupied housing in the same 
neighborhood. The second possibility is that effective demand for racial integration is 
greater among poor white households than nonpoor white households. Even if they share 
the same taste for segregation, the budget constraints of the poor white households reduce   16
their ability to realize this preference by substituting away from integrated neighborhoods. 
As a result, the racial price gaps may be considerably smaller across poor neighborhoods 
compared to nonpoor neighborhoods. 
The control variables generally have the expected effects on housing prices. The 
square footage and the presence of a fireplace increases housing prices significantly. 
Controlling for square footage, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms do not matter, and 
neither does the age of the house. At the neighborhood level, education is the dominant 
factor; a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of college graduates in the 
neighborhood is associated with an average premium of 8.9 percent. Controlling for 
poverty (disaggregated by race, as explained earlier), average household income of the 
neighborhood has no price effect. Of course, because education and income are highly 
correlated, it is possible that the education variable is in fact capturing the premium 
associated with educated, high-income, white-collar neighborhoods. 
The addition of the three spatial amenity variables (table 4, column 2) improves 
the fit of the model marginally. Of the three variables, only the distance to the main road 
(Broadway) matters to housing prices, albeit in the opposite direction. We expected 
proximity to the economically depressed and crime-ridden commercial thoroughfare to 
have a negative impact of housing prices, but the OLS estimates find the opposite. 
Distance from the railroad and proximity to the main business district (Uptown) do not 
increase housing prices as expected. When the spatial variables are added, the black 
coefficient do not change much, but both the white poor and hispanic coefficients become 
larger and statistically significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The simple OLS results reported so far must be interpreted with caution because 
of potentially biased coefficients and errors that arise from unobserved neighborhood 
heterogeneity and spatial autocorrelation. Within the OLS framework, we attempt three 
different solutions to these problems. In the third column of table 4, OLS standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White method. In the fourth column 
of table 4, we estimate robust cluster standard errors where error terms of houses in the 
same block group are assumed correlated. Neither version of the robust standard errors 
qualitatively change the conclusions of the simple OLS model. In the last column of table  
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4, we introduce neighborhood fixed effects at the census tract level.23 Our goal here is 
reduce coefficient bias due to unobserved neighborhood heterogeneity by focusing on 
within-tract variation in the neighborhood variables. With fixed effects, we find several 
qualitative differences in the results; most importantly, the pattern of racial price 
discounts changed markedly—we find the largest discounts for hispanics, followed by 
poor whites and nonpoor blacks. The discount for poor blacks is not significantly different 
from zero. The absence of black-white differences in housing prices within census tracts 
provide us with the first clues that unobserved heterogeneity in neighborhood amenities 
may have biased our OLS coefficients and standard errors. However, including tract level 
fixed effect is not the most efficient solution to the problem because the within-tract 
variation in racial composition and housing prices may not be large enough for us to 
obtain significant results. 
 
4.2  Spatial Econometric Analysis 
Using the GeoDa 0.9.5i software, we construct a series of weight matrices with distance 
thresholds (τ) that start from a minimum of 0.32 miles and increase by 0.01 miles. All 
houses inside a threshold are assigned a value of one and all on the outside are assigned 
values of zero; the weights are then row-standardized. For each threshold, we carry out 
likelihood ratio tests for the presence of spatial lags and errors. 
Based on these tests (table 5), there is strong evidence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in error terms that are spatially correlated up to a distance threshold of 
approximately half a mile. The spatial error model is preferred to OLS until the threshold 
distance of 0.51 miles and the OLS model preferred thereafter. The spatial error model is 
significant at 5 percent level for all but τ=0.48,0.49,0.51, where the significance level 
drops to 10 percent. The spatial lag model is preferred to OLS with 10 percent 
significance for τ=0.33,0.34,0.35. However, in all three cases, robust LM tests indicate 
that spatial lags are not robust to the introduction of spatial errors. This spatial 
autocorrelation may arise from unobserved neighborhood characteristics such as crime 
rates, quality and proximity to elementary schools, and access to open space. Spatial 
autocorrelation can also arise from measurement errors associated with the arbitrary 
                                                 
23 Because the neighborhood variables of interest are defined at the block group level, the smallest spatial 
unit at which fixed effects can be introduced is the census tract.   18
nature of neighborhood boundaries that were used to compute neighborhood variables 
such as racial composition and economic conditions; for example, two houses will have 
spatially correlated errors if they are both located in a predominantly white block group, 
but close to the boundary with a predominantly black block group. 
Because there is no a priori reason to choose an arbitrary threshold, we estimate 
spatial error models with incrementally larger thresholds in the interval τ=(0.32,0,51). The 
R square, the log likelihood, and the Moran’s I generally decrease as the threshold 
increases (table 5, column 2 and table 6, columns 2 and 3). In terms of the goodness of fit, 
the minimum threshold τ=0.32 is the preferred model. Table 7 compares the full set of 
estimates of the preferred minimum threshold model with the OLS model. Our primary 
goal, however, is not so much finding the best fit model, but ascertaining whether the 
OLS estimates of the racial price discounts are biased by the presence of spatially 
dependent observations. Table 6 reports a summary of results for all thresholds. In 
contrast to the OLS model, the black nonpoor coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero for τ=(0.32,0.37). In the interval τ=(0.38,0.46), this coefficient is significant at 
the 10 percent level, but is only about half as large as the OLS coefficient. For higher 
thresholds, price discount increases to −0.61 and is significant at the 5 percent level; the 
thresholds, however, are so large that they only weakly capture the spatial dependence of 
errors. The black poor, white poor, and Hispanic coefficients are not statistically different 
from zero along the entire range.24 Between τ=(0.32,0.37), the spatial error model 
completely eliminates racial price discounts. At higher thresholds, relatively weak and 
smaller discount exist only for nonpoor blacks. 
The spatial error model also yields more reasonable coefficients for the spatial 
control variables. Proximity to the business district (Uptown) increases prices 
significantly (at 10 percent level), whereas proximity to the main thoroughfare and the 
railroad has a negative but statistically insignificant effect. These results are more 
consonant with our expectations than the OLS results. 
The key result of our analysis is the evidence we provide for the propensity of 
OLS to incorrectly find the presence of racial preferences in hedonic pricing models in the 
presence of spatially correlated unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., crime, elementary 
                                                 
24 The white poor coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level for τ=(0.33,0.37),(0.4,0.41),0.51.  
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schools, environmental amenities, etc.). In fact, the spatial error model for the most part 
rejects the conclusion of the OLS model that racial preferences are capitalized in the 
housing market. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Our goal in this paper was to test for racial preferences in a small urban housing market in 
the United States. The simple OLS estimates conformed with the consensus in the 
hedonic pricing literature that black neighborhoods have price discounts. This negative 
effect was eliminated when census tract level fixed effects are introduced. We 
hypothesized, based on this initial findings, that unobserved neighborhood heterogeneity 
may lead OLS-based studies to incorrectly find racial preferences in housing markets. The 
primary contribution of this paper is the use of spatial econometric methods to explicitly 
model the spatial dependence of observations that arise due to unobserved heterogeneity 
of neighborhoods and measurement errors associated with the definition of neighborhood 
boundaries. We find strong evidence that the errors of the OLS model are autocorrelated 
spatially, yielding biased standard errors. When we correct for spatial errors using a series 
of weight matrices with different neighborhood distance thresholds, we find that the racial 
price discounts are much smaller and, for most thresholds, statistically insignificant. Our 
results suggest that price discounts in black neighborhoods are caused not by racial 
prejudice, but by the demand for amenities that are typically not found in black 
neighborhoods. Even if white households prefer racial integration and black households 
prefer racial segregation, the demand for housing in black neighborhoods will be low 
from both groups as long as there are too few black neighborhoods with favorable 
amenities. 
Our finding of estimation bias in OLS is particularly interesting because we took 
great care to construct a sample that minimizes unobserved heterogeneity of 
neighborhoods. Unlike much of the literature, we examine microneighborhoods in a 
compact city that has little variation in the housing stock, access to amenities, 
employment, and educational opportunities. Additionally, we include several control 
variables that are explicitly designed to capture exogenous variation in neighborhood   20
quality. Our results suggest that the spatial dispersion of black and white households 
follows the dispersion in the quality of amenities even in a relatively small, integrated, 
and homogenous urban area. For example, it is possible that the relatively black 
neighborhoods have higher crime and drug activity and lower quality elementary schools. 
As long as these amenity differences exist, the demand for housing in black 
neighborhoods will continue to be low regardless of the presence of racial preferences. 
From a policy perspective, this study underscores the need to improve the quality 
of amenities in black neighborhoods. As Bayer and McMillan (2006) have pointed out, 
the United States continues to have too few black neighborhoods with high quality 
schools, well maintained public spaces, and high levels of public safety. Our findings 
suggest that resources between and within cities and school districts are not distributed in 
a way that equalizes the amenity quality across microneighborhoods. The investment in 
the development of safe and attractive black neighborhoods does not necessarily 
encourage racial integration; the demand from white households with a taste for 
integration will increase, but so will the demand from black households with a taste for 
segregation. As Cashin (2004) points out, however, the goal of policymakers should not 
necessarily be the attainment of racial integration, but the elimination of amenity and 
price differences that have persisted along racial lines. Urban black households must be 
able to purchase houses in neighborhoods that provide a safe and attractive space to raise 
and educate their children without having to compromise on their racial preferences. 
Similarly, progressive white households should be able to fulfill their preference for 
integration without compromising on their preference for good schools and safe streets. 
This “vicious cycle” between race and amenities cannot be broken without a concerted 
effort by policymakers to invest in schools, parks, libraries, and community policing in 
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Table 1 Race-Ethnicity Composition
Race or ethnicity 1990 2000 2005-2007
White only 87.4 80.4 76.3
Black only 10.1 12.8 15.2
Other or mixed 2.5 6.8 8.5
Hispanic origin  2.7 6.5 8.1
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Table 2: Measures of Racial Segregation
    Year   Neighborhood unit   Dissimilarity (D)   Isolation (I)   Exposure (E)
1990  Census Tract  0.38 0.16 0.09
       Census Block Group  0.43 0.21 0.09
2000  Census Tract  0.24 0.18 0.14
      Census Block Group  0.29 0.21 0.14









Table 3: Neighborhood Characteristics
Block   Mean   Black   Black   White   Hispanic   College   Per Capita
Group   Price   Non-Poor   Poor   Poor     Educated   Income
9517-1 165.9 7.86 0.41 9.21 2.98 15.19 21.56
9517-2 135.98 16.41 7.07 12.77 6.66 17.75 13.86
9517-3 192.92 16.06 11.77 3.21 11.01 20.19 15.31
9517-4 193.53 8.03 3.76 8.73 7.68 19.66 19.12
9518-1 150.58 8.22 3.35 9.27 4.73 10.68 15.76
9519-1 162.79 7.78 0 12.72 5.68 17.21 15.78
9519-2 162.06 7.37 0 8.04 2.68 19.06 22.31
9519-3 137.83 0.48 16.96 8.87 7.13 9.93 13.05
9519-4 141.65 9.51 0 5.41 7.38 14.53 17.62
9520-1 149.28 4.73 3.62 14.75 6.12 14.62 20.05
9520-2 142.59 8.56 7.48 17.29 13.97 16.16 13.02
9521-1 158.85 7.58 0 9.33 3.06 16.15 20.91
9521-2 131.25 16.71 19.13 12.76 13.78 7.71 12.42
9521-3 128.1 22.14 5.31 12.14 8.27 7.76 11.61
9521-4 173.3 9.11 2.59 9.34 8.44 19.05 14.13
9522-1 200.51 5.31 0 13.79 4.6 47.56 27.74
9522-2 221.5 0.43 0 14.76 1.15 31.54 22
9522-3 241.19 4.8 1.89 2.18 6.69 41.33 38.44
9522-4 151.49 5.67 3.61 6.1 5.48 11.84 14.68
9523-1 185.05 6.96 0 2.22 4 27.78 21.16
9523-2 155.43 4.63 0 4.15 3.57 20.77 19.62
9524-1 162.3 2.56 1.08 4.45 3.23 30.12 26.3
9524-2 224.98 5.23 0 3.04 5.4 36.28 31.52
9524-3 189.14 6.52 2.37 13.3 7.24 25.29 19.61
Total 169.62 7.85 3.57 9.22 6.34 20.86 19.7











Table 4: Summary of OLS Results 
(1) (2 (3) (4) (5)
OLS 1 OLS 2 Robust Cluster F. E.
Year Built       0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
                 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Square Feet         0.0002***    0.0002***    0.0002***    0.0002***    0.0002***
                 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Bedrooms         0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004
                 (0.0106 (0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0106) (0.0105)
Bathrooms        0.0143 0.0150 0.0150 0.0150 0.0191
                 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0194) (0.018)
Fireplaces          0.1602***    0.1599***    0.1599***    0.1599***    0.1548***
                 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0171) (0.0171)
% Black Non Poor   -1.0182***   -1.0848***   -1.0848***   -1.0848***   -0.8686** 
                 (0.2197) (0.2267) (0.237) (0.2182) (0.3237)
% Black Poor       -0.7076**    -0.6293**    -0.6293**    -0.6293*** -0.4061
                 (0.2775) (0.2784) (0.2905) (0.2064) (0.3988)
% White Poor     -0.3475   -0.4885*     -0.4885**  -0.4885   -1.3081** 
                 (0.2542) (0.2596) (0.2425) (0.3147) (0.6038)
% Hispanic       -0.3898   -1.0474**    -1.0474**   -1.0474*   -1.7261*
                 (0.461) (0.5073) (0.5238) (0.5923) (0.904)
% College           0.8890***    0.8340***    0.8340***    0.8340***    1.1561***
                 (0.1757) (0.2081) (0.2007) (0.2429) (0.2842)
Income p.c.      -0.0038 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0032   -0.0076*  
















Table 4: Continued from Previous Page
(1) (2 (3) (4) (5)
OLS 1 OLS 2 Robust Cluster F. E.
Dist to Broadway                      -0.1114***   -0.1114***   -0.1114**  -0.0047
                                    (0.0305) (0.0364) (0.0481) (0.0555)
Dist to Railroad                    0.0348 0.0348 0.0348 0.0394
                                    (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0315) (0.0479)
Dist to Uptown                      -0.0209 -0.0209 -0.0209   -0.1804***
                                    (0.0172) (0.0198) (0.0214) (0.0462)
Constant           10.9412***   10.8383***   10.8383***   10.8383***   11.2242***
                 (0.6614) (0.6646) (0.9218) (1.1524) (1.3884)
Observations     1678 1678 1678 1678 1678
(R^{2)        0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59
Adjusted (R^{2) 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
Log L            -556.01 -548.65 -548.65 -548.65 -534.91
Standard errors in parentheses. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)

















Table 5: Spatial Model Diagnostic Tests
Spatial Lag Spatial Error Preferred
Threshold Moran's I LM Robust LM LM Robust LM Model 
0.32  0.0204**  6.50** 0.22  28.43**  22.15**  SE
0.33 0.0170**  3.48* 0.55  20.78**  17.85**  SE 
0.34  0.0171**  3.46* 0.66  22.43**  19.64**  SE
0.35  0.0162**  2.83* 0.82  21.13**  19.12**  SE
0.36  0.0151** 1.88 1.31  19.49**  18.92**  SE
0.37  0.0137** 1.41 1.27  17.08**  16.94**  SE
0.38 0.0123** 1.14 1.06  14.27**  14.19**  SE
0.39  0.0103** 0.67 0.92  10.48**  10.73**  SE
0.40  0.0088** 0.52 0.67  7.93**  8.08**  SE
0.41  0.0091** 0.62 0.68  9.01**  9.07**  SE
0.42  0.0079** 0.4 0.61  7.01**  7.22**  SE
0.43  0.0069** 0.52 0.27  5.63**  5.38**  SE
0.44 0.0069** 0.39 0.41  5.84**  5.86**  SE
0.45  0.0062** 0.22 0.49  4.90**  5.18**  SE
0.46  0.0065** 0.28 0.5  5.58**  5.80**  SE
0.47  0.0057** 0.22 0.39  4.43**  4.60**  SE
0.48  0.0048** 0.11 0.37  3.26*  3.52*  (SE)
0.49  0.0044** 0.14 0.25  2.87*  2.98*  (SE)
0.50 0.0054** 0.26 0.32  4.49**  4.55**  SE
0.51  0.0046** 0.06 0.5  3.36*  3.80* (SE)
0.52  0.0040** 0 0.84 2.59  3.42*  OLS 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05











Table 6: Spatial Error Model - Summary of Results
Log Black Black White College Per Capita
Threshold R square Likelihood Non Poor  Poor  Poor Hispanic Educated Income
0.32 0.5940 -529.68 -0.443 -0.368 -0.604 0.147  0.719**  0.000
0.33 0.5910 -533.56 -0.470 -0.410  -0.639*  0.087  0.741**  -0.001
0.34 0.5920 -532.85 -0.478 -0.404  -0.647*  0.055  0.744**  -0.001
0.35 0.5920 -532.62 -0.469 -0.409  -0.664*  0.091  0.738**  -0.001
0.36 0.5920 -532.53 -0.449 -0.378  -0.643*  0.037  0.730**  -0.001
0.37 0.5910 -534.6 -0.467 -0.371  -0.609*  -0.083  0.762**  -0.001
0.38 0.5900 -536.51  -0.482*  -0.362 -0.590 -0.193  0.793**  -0.002
0.39 0.5890 -539.02  -0.484*  -0.315 -0.568 -0.366  0.822**  -0.002
0.40 0.5870 -541.63  -0.520*  -0.343  -0.614*  -0.490  0.841**  -0.003
0.41 0.5870 -541.32  -0.511*  -0.308  -0.579*  -0.533  0.866**  -0.003
0.42 0.5870 -542.68  -0.504*  -0.301 -0.552 -0.589  0.877**  -0.003
0.43 0.5870 -543.02  -0.478*  -0.284 -0.540 -0.645  0.897**  -0.003
0.44 0.5870 -542.25  -0.486*  -0.278 -0.529 -0.683  0.899**  -0.003
0.45 0.5870 -542.27  -0.497*  -0.268 -0.502 -0.699  0.899**  -0.003
0.46 0.5880 -541.46  -0.515*  -0.274 -0.490 -0.720  0.892**  -0.003
0.47 0.5880 -578.58  -0.519**  -0.279 -0.506 -0.715  0.898**  -0.003
0.48 0.5870 -543.03  -0.536**  -0.277 -0.486 -0.756  0.893**  -0.003
0.49 0.5870 -543.37  -0.558**  -0.282 -0.500 -0.753  0.892**  -0.004
0.50 0.5870 -542.04  -0.586**  -0.281 -0.508 -0.777  0.895**  -0.004
0.51 0.5860 -542.91  -0.607**  -0.297  -0.523*  -0.787  0.881**  -0.004






Table 7: OLS and Spatial Error Result for Optimal Threshold  (0.32) 
OLS Spatial Error
Variable Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
 Constant   10.838**  0.665  10.927**  0.675
House Characteristics
Year Built 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Square Feet   0.000**  0.000  0.000**  0.000
Bedrooms 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.010
Bathrooms 0.015 0.017 0.023 0.017
Fireplace dummy   0.160**  0.018  0.144**  0.017
House type dummy (Reference: Ranch)
Raised Ranch   0.202**  0.085  0.181**  0.082
Split Level  0.113 0.094 0.127 0.091
Cape Cod  0.016 0.044 0.008 0.042
Colonial   -0.178**  0.062  -0.120**  0.060
Contemporary 0.038 0.111   0.188*  0.107
Mansion   -0.368**  0.153  -0.332**  0.147
Old Style   -0.089**  0.037  -0.074**  0.036
Cottage   -0.265**  0.113  -0.253**  0.110
Row 0.096 0.160 0.117 0.155
Duplex -0.061 0.085 -0.033 0.082
Bungalow   -0.150**  0.058  -0.164*  0.056
Other   0.175*  0.091  0.160*  0.091
Town House   0.274**  0.065  0.473**  0.073
Neighborhood Characteristics
% Black Poor   -0.629**  0.278 -0.368 0.334
% Black Non-Poor   -1.085**  0.227 -0.443 0.304
% White Poor   -0.489*  0.260 -0.604 0.378
% Hispanic   -1.047**  0.507 0.147 0.707
% College Educated   0.834**  0.208  0.719**  0.275
Income p.c.  -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.004
Spatial Amenities
Dist to Broadway   -0.111**  0.030 0.021 0.071
Dist to Railroad  0.035 0.027 0.099 0.076









Table 7: Continued from Previous Page
OLS Spatial Error
Variable Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Year of Sale dummy (Reference: 2001)
2002   0.155** 0.036   0.149** 0.035
2003   0.391** 0.035   0.392** 0.034
2004   0.612** 0.034   0.609** 0.033
2005   0.770** 0.033   0.773** 0.032
2006   0.824** 0.035   0.826** 0.034
2007   0.804** 0.036   0.802** 0.034
Month of Sale dummy (Reference: January)
February 0.042 0.048 0.052 0.047
March 0.070 0.046 0.054 0.044
April 0.005 0.044 0.018 0.042
May 0.068 0.044   0.075*  0.042
June   0.077*  0.042  0.078*  0.041
July 0.059 0.043 0.053 0.041
August    0.155** 0.043   0.154** 0.042
September    0.163** 0.043   0.163** 0.042
October    0.101** 0.043   0.112** 0.041
November    0.105** 0.044   0.113** 0.042
December    0.101** 0.042   0.107** 0.040
Spatial Correlation Parameter
Lambda         0.805**  0.050
Model Diagnostics
 R-sq       0.579    0.594   
 Adj R-sq    0.567         
 Log L  -548.650    -529.680   
 Number of Observa 1678.000    1678.000   



















   32
 
 
















Figure 3: Convergence of Housing Prices, 1996-2000 to 2001-2007 
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Figure 5: Change in Racial Composition in 1990-2000 and Change in Median Housing 
Price 2001-2007 